Deborah Hauptmann

Dear Yuvacan,

Yes, I am so sorry that I did not respond to your mail. Do I understand correctly that you have, in fact, already come to Holland and returned home again?

I am afraid that since the faculty fire my agenda has been so full I hardly have time to think - much less the freedom to meet with persons, such as yourself, and discuss things as important as your thesis research. Nevertheless, I am very pleased to know that you are undertaking such a difficult challenge as applying Bergsonian philosophy to architecture.

Naturally the issue of durée (duration or durance when following Moore) is at the core of Bergson philosophy. No doubt you are familiar with his letter to Harold Höffding (1917) whereby he identifies the issues you too outlined in your abstract, he writes:

"In my opinion, any summary of my views will deform them in their ensemble and will thus expose them to a multitude of objections if it does not look at what is first and does not always return to what I consider the core of my doctrine: the intuition of duration. The representation of a multiplicity of reciprocal
( karşılıklı)penetration( nüfuz etme), most different from numerical multiplicity – the representation of a heterogeneous, qualitative and creative duration-, that is the point I started from and where I constantly return…."

Perhaps, I should also mention that in attempting to extrapolate his notion of intuition (as method) to design method you are taking on a very large task. In your abstract you write that "after defining duration ... intuition can emerge as a way of comprehending the qualitative degrees in multiplicity..." However, you should understand that intuition (in Bergson) is something that does not merely 'emerge' as you suggest (or perhaps as we would both hope), but something which takes a highly concerted( birlikte yapılmış.)effort of reflection, again from the letter to Höffding, he writes:

‘… for me, practical knowledge is truly knowledge of reality itself, of absolute reality, that place where it truly belongs (where it stays in its own domain). Thus intelligence whose role is to master no organized matter, is able to know this matter absolutely, although incompletely. In the same way, instinct, which is made to use life, know life absolutely and from the inside, although incompletely and hardly consciously. Thus human intuition – that extends, develops and translates in thought what is left from instinct(ic gudu) in man – is able to embrace(kapsamak) life more and more completely. Knowledge, whether intellectual or intuitive, becomes relative( Göreceli) only when the faculty of knowing applies to things it is not made for. Such is the knowledge of life that conceptual intelligence (mechanism) claims to give us; and such was the way we represented matter long ago, with images taken from the world of life (hylozoism).holistic’

Or in Creative Evolution, paraphrasing simply: 'Intuition (is not instinct) if it is anything at all it is reflection'.

In this work we see him dealing with the two doctrines of mechanism and finalism - Bergson will more closely accept certain conditions of the latter – this is not unlike the way in Matter and Memory he put forward idealism and realism (materialism) and also opted to align himself more closely with the latter than the former. Here we see his method, he cannot invent an entirely new philosophy which does not at least touch upon principles which are already known – there is no ‘tabula rasa’ so to speak – but the philosophy of durée and the method of intuition are no less original and unique even if they take partial benefit and recognition from representations already real, as contemporary philosophy (i.e. Deleuze) takes the virtual in its differentiation from that which was, and now real for us as we go on to ‘invent’ with it further…..

Well, I will not now continue with this further. However, if you do decide to put your work forward in English I would be pleased to see later drafts. In the meantime I have attached a copy of a paper I wrote on the concept of multiplicity. It is not the paper I delivered at the Bergson conference which you referred to in your previous mail, but it is a paper that derived from a lecture I gave and so it is written in very straightforward terms and, for you, no doubt very accessible. It Perhaps you will enjoy it.

All my best,

Deborah Hauptmann

ABSTARCT-01

1. ABSTRACT

The mistake is due to our believing that perception and memory are pure knowledge!
H.Bergson

The aim of thesis is to research matter and human relations in action of design concept. The thesis takes its starting point from Henry Bergson’s main notions of Duration, memory and intuition.

My thesis is divided in two basic parts; defining the design process and design knowledge by using Bergsons notions. How we getting data from world ? and how we use them for designing? Basis of discussion try to define duration as a basement of matter and human, could juxtaposition with non-dualistic way and search the way of obtain design knowledge.

Notion of Duration will be used to encounter human and matter without dualistic way of time and space contex. Bergson define every being as a multiplicity in conscious states and he adds that there are two kinds of multiplicity; two senses of the word "distinguish." the one qualitative and the other quantitative. All quantitative differences give different positions in homogeneous space but qualitative differences define mod, tone of objects in time. It follows from this analysis that space alone is homogeneous, that objects in space form a discrete multiplicity, and that every discrete multiplicity is got by a process of unfolding in space. There is neither duration nor even succession in space; their multiplicity is real only for a consciousness.

İn the basis of Duration the matter either natural or artifical, is aggregate of ‘images’. object exists independently of the consciousness which perceives it but on the other hand, the object is entirely different from that which is perceived in it.

“Matter,in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’. And by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing.” ( Bergson H.,Matter and Memory, 1)

Bergson deals with body and mind in such a way as, we hope, if not to overcome, the theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism.With same context human being is defined as a multiplicity with notion of memory.

Perception and memory a difference of degree-- perceptions being then supposed to throw memories back into the past, and thus to reserve to themselves the present simply because right is might. But there is much more between past and present than a mere difference of degree. My present is that which interests me, which lives for me, and, in a word, that which summons me to action; whereas my past is essentially powerless. We must dwell further on this point. By contrasting it with present perception we shall better understand the nature of what we call 'pure memory.' (Bergson H., Matter and Memory, 176)

After defining the Duration as a basis for human and objects multiplicitiy, intuition can be emerge as way of comprehend the gualititatives degrees in multiplicities.

Most of the design field consider design as a presentation in space. In this wise designing is accepted determinations of quantities. In this wise analysis is popular method of designing. All through my thesis, my aim is beside the Bergson acknowledges define design and designer in duration with accepting their time qualitatives. By this way question the design knowledge and research the intution as a method in design process.

Keywords:

Duration, Memory, Conciousness, Multiplicity, Virtual, Intuition, Qualitative

ANKRAJ Steven Holl

Yazının mimari ile ilişkisi kanıta tutulan kötü bir ayna gibidir, mimarinin kendisi olan ve mekan, ışık ve maddeden oluşan bölgeye dalma şansımız daha çok sözcüklerden arınmış bir sesizlikte gerçekleşir. Mimari kanıta erişemeselerde sözcükler öncü bir fikri temsil ederler. Sözcükler etkisini yitirdiğinde bile, mimari yapıt aynı etkiyi korumaya zorlanır. Sözcükler doğru yönü işaret eden oklardır, bir araya geldiklerinde bir mimari amaçlar haritası oluştururlar.
Aşağıda geçen on yıl boyunca oluşturduğumuz projeler için katalizör görevi yapmış bir takım seçilmiş düşünceler yer almaktadır.


Mimarlık konuma bağlıdır.Müzik, resim, heykel, sinema ve edebiyattan farklı olarak taşınmaz konstrüksiyon, bir yerin yaşantısıyla kaynaşıktır. Bir binanın yerleşim alanı, onun oluşumunu belirleyen herhangi bir girdi olmanın ötesinde bir şeydir. Onun fiziksel ve metafizik temelidir.

Arsa ve binanın işlevsel yönlerinin, bakış açılarının, güneş açılarının, sirkülasyonunun ve girişlerinin çözümlenmesi mimarinin " metafiziği"gerektiren "fiziğidir". B u bağlantı yada dolaylı bir neden aracılığıyla bir bina, yerleşim alanına göre biçilmiş bir şey olmaktan ötede bir değer taşır.

Yapı, konumlandığı yerle kaynaşarak ve bir konumun anlamını kendisinde toplayarak fiziksel ve işlevsel gereksinmelerden aşkınlaşır. Mimarlık bir çevreyi açımlamaya hizmet ettiği sürece, oranın bütünlüğüne vermez. Bir arsayı değerlendirmek onun içinde yer aldığı" bağlamın"ın basiteindirgenmiş bir tekrarı değildir; bir yerin herhangi bir yönünü ortaya çıkarmak oranın görünümüne uygun olmayabilir. Bu yüzden alışılagelmiş görme biçimleri pekala kesintiye uğrayabilir.

Mimarlık ve yerleşim alanı yaşantısal bir ilişkiye, metafizik ve şiirsel bir bağlantıya sahip olmalıdır. Bir mimari ürün, bir yapı ile konumu başarılı bir biçimde kaynaştığında bir üçüncü durum ortaya çıkar. Bu üçüncü gerçeklikte gösterilen ve gösteren bütünleşir; ifade, yerleşim alanına bağlı olan düşünceyle ilinti kuran bir şeydir. Önerilen ve örtük olan bir amacın farklı yönleridir.

Bir binanın tek bir konumu vardır. Bu tek yerde, binanın tüm amaçları toplanır. Bina ve konumu mimarlığın başlangıcından beri birbirini belirleyicidir. Geçmişte bu bağlantı bilinçli bir çaba olmadan, yerel malzeme ve işgücü kullanımıyla, o alanın tarihsel olaylar ve mitoslarla yaptığı çağrışımlar aracılığıyla açığa çıkmıştır. Bugün mimarlık ve konum arasındaki bağlantı, modern yaşamdaki yapısal dönüşümlerin parçası olan yeni yollarla kurulmalıdır.

Yapı alanının ilk algılanışı sırasında akla gelen fikirler, başla-tıcı düşünceler üzerinde yapılan derinleşmeler ya da mevcut topografyanın yeniden irdelenmesi yeni buluşların ana çerçevesini oluşturabilir. Bu buluş türü, evrensel mekandan farklı, göreceli bir mekana odaklanır ve bağımlı bir egemenlik alanında konumlanır.

Mimarlık bir uzanım, bir yerle göreceli olarak ilintili mutlak anlamlar oluşturan bir uyarlamadır. Yeni bir ürün, varolan kuruluşların tersyüz edilmesi niteliğinde olsa bile,onun düzeni soyut mekanın genel özelliklerinden farklı bir yönünü kapsamaya veya özel bir anlamım aydınlatmaya çalışır. Özgül olanın içinde bir ideal, görece olanın içinde bir mutlaklık vardır.

Uxmal'daki manastırın avlusunda durduğumuzda, zaman saydam,işlev ise bilinmez niteliktedir. Güneşin yörüngesi mimariyle mükemmel bir biçimde uyumludur. Çerçevelenmiş manzaralar uzaktaki tepelerle bağlantılıdır. Balo avlusundan aşağı inerken, "KaplumbağalarEvi" ne tırmanırken ve tekrar büyük avluya baktığımızda elde edilen yaşantı,mimari güzelliği aşar. Mimarlık ve yerleşim alanı olgusal olarak bağlantılıdır.

Louis Kahn'ın Salk Enstitüsü'nde günün belirli saatinde, merkez avluyu ikiye bölen yarığın içinden akan sudan yansıyan ışık, okyanusun üzerinden yansıyan ışıkla birleşir. Okyanus ve avlu, suyun üzerinden yansıyan gün ışığı olgusu yoluyla birleşir. Mimarlık ve doğa ( konumlandıkları) yerin metafiziğinde bütünleşir.

Oregon'da verimli ve büyük bir vadide, Angel Dağı'ndaki Be-nedikten Manastırı'nın ucuna gayri muntazam bir form takılır. Tepe üstündeki manastır, bahçeden yaklaşıldığında alçak, tek katlı, mitevazı bir bina görüntüsü verir. Bir kez içine girildiğinde, yeryüzü ve gökyüzünün dalgalanan panoraması içinde özgürce yerleştirilmiş,dışarı ve aşağı doğru yönelen bir mekan patlaması gözler önüne serilir. Aalto, manastır platosunun kıyısını tamamlamış, çalışmak ve düşünmek için dingin bir mekan şelalesi yaratmıştır. Mimarlığın nitelikleri, konumunun nitelikleri ve anlamı ile yekvücuttur.

Japonya'daki büyük ise tapınakları her 20 yılda bir,iki komşu arsadan biri üzerinde yeniden inşa edilir. Her tapınağın iki arsası vardır. MÖ 4. yüzyıldan beri süregelen bu dini edimin gizemli gücü, en çok bir sonraki 20 yılda yapılacak yeni komşu tapınağı taş bloklarıyla hazır bekleyen boş arsada açığa çıkar. Zaman ve mekan, kapılar ve çitlere asılıp 10 günde bir değiştirilen kağıt süsler ( sakaki) ile daha da birbirleriyle ilişkili kılınır.

Adalberto Libera'nın Capri'deki Malaparte Evi mekan, ışık ve zaman içinde düzenin gizemli bir örneğini oluşturur. Basit duvarları kaya ve uçurumlara karışarak, kendini güneşe sunan garip bir platform gibi Akdeniz'den yükselir. Bu üslubu, ayırt edilebilen cepheleri bile olmaksızın, zamanın üzerinden sıçrayarak konumuyla bütünleşir.mimari matterın madde olmaktan cıkısı

boyut çağdaş dünya mimarları dizisi 2 steven holl kitabından alıntı

Anchoring, prıncton architectural press, New York, 3. baskı, 1991, s.9-11 çeviren :aslı şener

succession in duration

Bergson time and free will

The proof is that, if we interrupt the rhythm by dwelling longer than is right on one

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(101) note of the tune(ayar,ezgi), it is not its exaggerated(asırı abartı) length, as length, which will warn us of our mistake, but the qualitative change thereby caused in the whole of the musical phrase. We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual(karsılıklı) penetration(nufus etme delip gecme), an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought. Such is the account of duration which would be given by a being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space. But, familiar with the latter idea and indeed beset by it, we introduce it unwittingly into our feeling of pure succession ; we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another. Note that the mental image thus shaped implies the perception, no longer successive, but simultaneous, of a before and after, and that it would be a contradiction to suppose a succession which was only a succession, and which nevertheless was contained in one and the same instant. Now, when we speak of an order of succession in duration, and of the reversibility of this order, is the succession we are dealing with pure succession, such as we have just defined.

Bergson time and free will

mekan ve zaman homojen kavramlar değil

mekan ve zamanı homojen olmaktan cıkaran sey birbirlerine akısları. ve bu nitelik farklı, derece farkı degil. mod ları var..

98 Time, in so far as it is a homogeneous medium, and not concrete duration, is reducible to space

Now, if space is to be defined as the homogeneous, it seems that inversely every homogeneous and unbounded medium will be space. For, homogeneity here consisting in the absence of every quality, it is hard to see how two forms of the homogeneous could be distinguished from one another. Nevertheless it is generally agreed to regard time as an unbounded medium, different from space but homogeneous like the latter: the homogeneous is thus supposed to take two forms, according as its contents co-exist or follow one another. It is true that, when we make time a homogeneous medium in which conscious states unfold themselves, we take it to be given all at once, which amounts to saying that we abstract it from duration. This simple consideration ought to warn us that we are thus unwittingly falling back upon space, and really giving up time. Moreover, we can understand that material objects, being exterior to one another and to ourselves, derive both exteriorities from the homogeneity of a medium which inserts intervals between them and sets off their outlines : but states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one another, and in the simplest of them the whole soul can be reflected. We may therefore surmise that time, conceived under the form of a homogeneous medium, is spree spurious concept, due to the trespassing of the idea of space upon the field of pure consciousness. At any rate we cannot finally admit two

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(99) forms of the homogeneous, time and space, without first seeking whether one of them cannot be reduced to the other. Now, externality is the distinguishing mark of things which occupy space, while states of consciousness are not essentially external to one another, and become so only by being spread out in time, regarded as a homogeneous medium

time and free will

duration space iliskisi

(273) A very simple calculation shows that more than 25,000 years would elapse before the conclusion of the operation. Thus the sensation of red light, experienced by us in the course of a second, corresponds in itself to a succession(ardışık) of phenomena which, separately distinguished in our duration with the greatest possible economy of time, would occupy more than 250 centuries of our history. Is this conceivable ? We must distinguish here between our own duration and time in general. In our duration,-the duration which our consciousness perceives,-a given interval can only contain a limited number of phenomena of which we are aware. Do we conceive that this content can increase ; and when we speak of an infinitely divisible time, is it our own duration that we are thinking of ?
As long as we are dealing with space, we may carry the division as far as we please; we change in no way, thereby, the nature of what is divided. This is because space, by definition, is outside us; it is because a part of space appears to us to subsist even when we cease(durdurmak) to be concerned with it; so that, even when we leave it undivided, we know that it can wait, and that a new effort of our imagination may decompose it when we choose. As, moreover, it never ceases to be space, it always implies juxtaposition(bitisik) and consequently possible division. Abstract space is, indeed, at bottom, nothing but the mental diagram of infinite divisibility
(bergson matter and memory)

duration ozgur iradeyi acıklıyor.kanta cevap niteliginde

Duration is first introduced by Bergson in his essay Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. It is used as a defence of freewill in a response to Immanuel Kant, who believed freewill was only possible outside of time and space, but since man cannot transcend time and space, must be accepted for pragmatic purposes alone.^[7]

Bergson’s response to Kant is that freewill is only possible within Duration, within which time resides as it really exists. The problem of freewill is not really a problem at all for Bergson, but merely a common confusion among philosophers caused by the immobile time of science being mistaken for the Duration.^[8]

To understand this, one must realize while space can be measured, the Duration cannot be. Thus to measure the Duration, it must be translated into the immobile, spatial time of science through a translation of the unextended into the extended. Although an essential practicality of both science and everyday life, it is through this very translation, mistaken for the Duration, that the problem of freewill arises. Since space is a homogeneous, quantitative multiplicity, the Duration becomes juxtaposed and converted into a succession of distinct parts, one coming after the other and therefore caused by one another.(wikşipedia)

Dreyfus'un AI critiği

Dreyfus's critique of artificial intelligence (AI) concerns what he considers to be the four primary assumptions of AI research. The first two assumptions he criticizes are what he calls the "biological" and "psychological" assumptions. The biological assumption is that the brain is analogous to computer hardware and the mind is analogous to computer software. The psychological assumption is that the mind works by performing discrete computations (in the form of algorithmic rules) on discrete representations or symbols.

Dreyfus claims that the plausibility of the psychological assumption rests on two others: the epistemological and ontological assumptions. The epistemological assumption is that all activity (either by animate or inanimate objects) can be formalised (mathematically) in the form of predictive rules or laws. The ontological assumption is that reality consists entirely of a set of mutually independent, atomic (indivisible) facts. It's because of the epistemological assumption that workers in the field argue that intelligence is the same as formal rule-following, and it's because of the ontological one that they argue that human knowledge consists entirely of internal representations of reality.

On the basis of these two assumptions, workers in the field claim that cognition is the manipulation of internal symbols by internal rules, and that, therefore, human behaviour is, to a large extent, context free (see contextualism). Therefore a truly scientific psychology is possible, which will detail the 'internal' rules of the human mind, in the same way the laws of physics detail the 'external' laws of the physical world. But it is this key assumption that Dreyfus denies. In other words, he argues that we cannot now (and never will) be able to understand our own behavior in the same way as we understand objects in, for example, physics or chemistry: that is, by considering ourselves as things whose behaviour can be predicted via 'objective', context free scientific laws. According to Dreyfus, a context free psychology is a contradiction in terms.

Dreyfus's arguments against this position are taken from the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition (especially the work of Martin Heidegger). Heidegger argued that, contrary to the cognitivist views on which AI is based, our being is in fact highly context bound, which is why the two context-free assumptions are false. Dreyfus doesn't deny that we can choose to see human (or any) activity as being 'law governed', in the same way that we can choose to see reality as consisting of indivisible atomic facts...if we wish. But it is a huge leap from that to state that because we want to or can see things in this way that it is therefore an objective fact that they are the case. In fact, Dreyfus argues that they are not (necessarily) the case, and that, therefore, any research program that assumes they are will quickly run into profound theoretical and practical problems. Therefore the current efforts of workers in the field are doomed to failure.

Given that Dreyfus has a reputation as a Luddite in some quarters, it's important to emphasise that he doesn't believe that AI is fundamentally impossible; only that the current research program is fatally flawed. Instead he argues that to get a device (or devices) with human-like intelligence would require them to have a human-like being in the world, which would require them to have bodies more or less like ours, and social acculturation (i.e. a society) more or less like ours. (This view is shared by psychologists in the embodied psychology (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and distributed cognition traditions. His opinions are similar to those of robotics researchers such as Rodney Brooks as well as researchers in the field of artificial life.)

Daniel Crevier writes: "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments. Had he formulated them less aggressively, constructive actions they suggested might have been taken much earlier."^[1]

^(Wikipedia)

Merleau-Ponty

n his Phenomenology of Perception (first published in French in 1945), Merleau-Ponty developed the concept of the body-subject as an alternative to the Cartesian "cogito." This distinction is especially important in that Merleau-Ponty perceives the essences of the world existentially, as opposed to the Cartesian idea that the world is merely an extension of our own minds. Consciousness, the world, and the human body as a perceiving thing are intricately intertwined and mutually "engaged." The phenomenal thing is not the unchanging object of the natural sciences, but a correlate of our body and its sensorimotor functions. Taking up and coinciding with the sensible qualities it encounters, the body as incarnated subjectivity intentionally reconstructs things within an ever-present world frame, through use of its preconscious, prepredicative understanding of the world's makeup. Things are that upon which our body has a "grip" (prise), while the grip itself is a function of our connaturality with the world's things.

The essential partiality of our view of things, their being given only in a certain perspective and at a certain moment in time (v. the Uncertainty Principal of Werner Heisenberg) does not diminish their reality, but on the contrary establishes it, as there is no other way for things to be copresent with us and with other things than through such "Abschattungen" (profiles, adumbrations). The thing transcends our view, but is manifest precisely by presenting itself to a range of possible views. The object of perception is immanently tied to its background--to the nexus of meaningful relations among objects within the world. Because the object is inextricably within the world of meaningful relations, each object reflects the other (much in the style of Leibniz's monads). Through involvement in the world -- being-in-the-world-- the perceiver projects around the object, in a nonthetic manner, all the potential perspectives of that object, and the perspectives of the object coming from all the surrounding things of its environment. Each object is a "mirror of all others." Our perception of the object through all perspectives is not that of a thetic, propositional, or clearly delineated perception. Rather, it is an ambiguous perception founded upon the body's primordial involvement and understanding of the world and of the meanings that constitute the landscape's perceptual gestalt. Only after we have been integrated within the environment so as to perceive objects as such can we turn our attention toward particular objects within the landscape so as to define them more clearly. (This attention, however, does not operate by clarifying what is already seen, but by constructing a new Gestalt oriented toward a particular object.) Because our bodily involvement in the world is nonthetic and indeterminate, we encounter meaningful things in a unified though ever open-ended world.

Critics have remarked that while Merleau-Ponty makes a great effort to break away from Cartesian dualism, in the end Phenomenology of Perception still starts out from the opposition of consciousness and its objects. Merleau-Ponty himself also acknowledged this and in his later work attempted to proceed from a standpoint of our existential unity with what he called the "flesh" (chair) of the world.

From the time of writing Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty wanted to show, in opposition to the idea that drove the tradition beginning with John Locke, that perception was not the causal product of atomic sensations. This atomist-causal conception was being perpetuated in certain psychological currents of the time, particularly in behaviourism. According to Merleau-Ponty, perception has an active dimension, in that it is a primordial openness to the life world (to the 'Lebenswelt')

This primordial openness is at the heart of his thesis of the primacy of perception. The slogan of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is "all consciousness is consciousness of something", which implies a distinction between "acts of thought" (the noesis) and "intentional objects of thought" (the noema). Thus, the correlation between noesis and noema becomes the first step in the constitution of analyses of consciousness.

However, in studying the posthumous manuscripts of Husserl, who remained one of his major influences, Merleau-Ponty remarked that, in their evolution, Husserl's work brings to light phenomena which are not assimilable to noetic-noematic correlation. This is particularly the case when one attends to the phenomena of the body (which is at once body-subject and body-object), subjective time (the consciousness of time is neither an act of consciousness nor an object of thought) and the other (the first considerations of the other in Husserl led to solipsism).

The distinction between "acts of thought" (noesis) and "intentional objects of thought" (noema) does not seem, therefore, to constitute an irreducible ground. It appears rather at a higher level of analysis. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not postulate that "all consciousness is consciousness of something", which supposes at the outset a noetic-noematic ground. Instead, he develops the thesis according to which "all consciousness is perceptual consciousness". In doing so, he establishes a significant turn in the development of phenomenology, indicating that its conceptualisations should be re-examined in the light of the primacy of perception, in weighing up the philosophical consequences of this thesis.

yuvacanatmaca

phenomenology algıdaki indigeyici bakısa karsı.

Husserl derived many important concepts that are central to phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teachers, the philosophers and psychologists Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf.^[6] An important element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed from Brentano was intentionality (often described as "aboutness"), the notion that consciousness always is consciousness of something. The object of consciousness is called the intentional object, and this object is constituted for consciousness in many different ways, through for instance perception, memory, protetion, retention, signification, etc. Throughout these different intentionalities, though they have different structures and different ways of being "about" the object, an object is still constituted as the same identical object; consciousness is directed at the same intentional object in direct perception as it is in the immediately following retention of this object and the eventual remembering of it.

It should be clarified right from the start that even though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is essentially anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions. In other words, when a reference is made to a thing's essence or idea, or when one details the constitution of an identical coherent thing by describing how what one "really" sees as being only these sides and aspects, these surfaces, it does not mean that the thing is only and exclusively what is described here: The ultimate goal of these reductions is to understand how these different aspects are constituted into the actual thing as experienced by the person experiencing it. Phenomenology is a direct reaction to the psychologism and physicalism of Husserl's time.(wikipedia)